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The riots of 2011 were one of the events which defined Recession-era Britain. The 
unrest began in Tottenham, north London, on 6 August when a demonstration outside 
Tottenham Police Station about the killing of Mark Duggan (an unarmed, black man) by 
armed police escalated into a riot. The next four nights saw 15,000 people take to the 
streets as violent unrest spread to towns and cities across the country. Five people lost 
their lives, hundreds of police officers were injured and £250 million worth of damage 
was done to shops and businesses in London alone (Riots, Communities and Victims 
Panel, 2012). The events in London were one of the largest waves of rioting in recent 
British history. Given the scale of events, the extensive police investigation, and the 
ubiquity of mobile phone use during them, they offer the possibility of undertaking a 
significant sociological case study exploiting a mass of quantitative and qualitative data. 
I use these resources to make two key arguments. First, I challenge the dominant 
explanation of the riots as an outcome of ‘criminal opportunism’, finding instead that 
they were a complex and heterogeneous phenomenon, in which people staked claims to 
the public spaces in which they lived. Second, I argue that these events demonstrate a 
need to find ways to embed historical and structural forces into a micro-level, 
interactionist framework. Specifically, the emotional dynamics of these riot interactions 
cannot be understood without acknowledging participants’ pre-existing expectations of 
the police and of the everyday places of the riot. 
For many commentators, the distinguishing feature of the London Riots was the 
widespread looting (Valluvan et al 2013). Left wing columnist Zoe Williams described 
the events as ‘shopping riots’ (2011) and Prime Minister David Cameron went further, 
claiming that they were ‘criminality, pure and simple’ (2011). This focus on looting has 
dominated popular debates on the riots, and it has also shaped academic and policy 
responses. Indeed, most mainstream sociological approaches to the unrest have been 
grounded in consumerism or entrepreneurship (Bauman, 2011; Moxon 2011; Zizek 
2011; Briggs 2012; Harvey 2013; Treadwell et al 2013). However, there have been 
critical voices, looking instead at ‘grievance, lack of opportunity, shared identity and 
empowerment’ (Stott and Reicher 2011, p. 1370) or the chance to ‘give the police a 
boshing’ (BBC 2012a, 49:45). This divide between the “criminal opportunism” 
perspective and its critics quickly became, and remains, the central debate about the 
London Riots. 
Curiously, most of the quantitative work on the London Riots has sidestepped this 
debate entirely. Researchers have used the Metropolitan Police’s extensive arrest data to 
look at issues like the geographic diffusion of rioting (Davies et al 2013), the pattern of 
areas targeted (Baudains, Braithwaite and Johnson 2013), and whether harsher riot 
sentences worked as a deterrent (Bell et al 2014). But they have all either accepted the 
criminal opportunism perspective or ignored the issue altogether. A partial exception is 
Kawalerowicz and Biggs’s (2015) work examining rioters’ home neighbourhoods, 
which resurrects the language of economic grievance and demonstrates the importance 
of attitudes towards the police in predicting riot participation. However, it remains an 
ecological analysis which leaves the issue of individuals’ motives and behaviours to one 
side.  
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Most of the empirical studies looking at criminal opportunism have instead been 
qualitative, and thus far, they have produced contradictory findings. On one side, 
Treadwell et al (2013) concluded, on the basis of ethnographic work, that the riots were 
the result of an ‘objectless dissatisfaction’ and the ‘opportunity to do some free 
shopping’ (p.1). On the other side, Lewis et al’s (2012) larger set of retrospective 
interviews revealed a broad variety of motives: from entrepreneurship to consumerism 
to the explicitly political. More recently Newburn et al (2015) used those interviews to 
argue that our obsession with looting has caused us to neglect the riots’ complex and 
violent nature. 
My contribution to this debate is to use a quantitative data set (the Metropolitan Police 
Service [MPS] record of all riot-related crimes) to test several hypotheses derived from 
the criminal opportunism perspective. This tests a macro-level theory about what caused 
the riots against micro-level data on the actual behaviours that made up those riots. By 
showing that this theory cannot account for the riots’ spatial patterning, I open up space 
for alternative explanatory mechanisms. I then try to supply such a mechanism by using 
video footage of the riots to suggest that the emotional energy of the riots came from 
people staking a claim to the public spaces in which they lived. These riots were an 
opportunity to own these places and act with impunity, even if only for a few hours. 
This is not intended to be a ‘master variable’ which explains rioting in general. As will 
be shown below, these riots were complex and heterogeneous and the challenge should 
be to build up a range of different explanatory mechanisms. My argument is rather that 
the importance of criminal opportunism has been grossly overstated while the 
importance of reclaiming the everyday has been generally overlooked. 
In what follows I begin by reviewing the sociological literature on riots and 
demonstrating a need to link micro-sociology of riots to broader contextual factors 
(connecting the micro with the macro). I then introduce the quantitative data and the 
video archives used in this research. The quantitative dataset is then used to demonstrate 
some key weaknesses in the criminal opportunism perspective. I then use video footage 
and testimonies of events on the ground to examine the interactions which made up the 
riots and I argue that these suggest the importance of ‘reclaiming the everyday’. I then 
conclude by considering how the London Riots, as a case study, informs our wider 
sociological understanding of riots. 
 
The importance of expectations 
 
Although there is a rich and varied history of sociological research into riots and crowd 
violence (see Bagguley and Hussain 2008, Borch 2012 and Clover 2016 for 
summaries), the most distinctive recent contribution has been the interactionist 
approach. Building on work by Collins (2008), researchers have turned their attention to 
the emotional dynamics which emerge out of interactions between perpetrators, victims, 
and law enforcement (Ketchley, 2014; Weenink, 2014; Nassauer, 2016; Gross, 2016). 
This turn towards the actual interactions, behaviours, and situations which make up a 
riot echoes an earlier call made by McPhail to focus on the processes within a riot and 
not to treat it only as an outcome to be explained by prior circumstances (1994). But 
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Collins’s distinctive contribution is a sophisticated theorisation of the process through 
which a riot comes about: the emergence of a ‘moral holiday’, a free zone in time and 
space which marks the breakdown of social control and constitutes the riot situation 
(2008). 
Collins grounds his account in Goffman and Durkheim’s ‘micro-sociology’, arguing 
that, when in a crowd, people become entrained in mutual interaction. As we react to 
each others’ body language and explicit actions we generate emotional energy and a 
sense of solidarity. This creates a powerful feeling of collective effervescence which 
combines with open public defiance to create and sustain the ‘moral holiday’ (Collins, 
2008). Although persuasive, this account runs into internal and external problems. 
Externally, it seems to render riots more-or-less contingent, preventing us from linking 
them to structural factors such as ethnic tension (Olzak, Shanahan and McEneaney, 
1996), hostility to the police (Perez, Kimberly and Myers, 2002), austerity policies 
(Ponticelli and Voth, 2011) or socio-economic disadvantage (Kawalerowicz and Biggs, 
2015). Internally, Collins is unable to explain which norms break down during a ‘moral 
holiday’ and which remain. He admits that ‘moral holidays tend to specialize in 
particular kinds of violations’ (2008, p. 243) but is unable to explain why, for example, 
sexual violence normally remains prohibited while looting is often legitimised. 
In fact these internal and external problems are two sides of the same coin. The 
fundamental issue is that it is not clear how Collins’s theory can incorporate social and 
historical context. His theory is based on a particular view of human biology (which has 
received criticism from some, e.g. Felson, 2009) and the emotions which emerge within 
interactions. Although this level of abstraction has obvious advantages, he does not 
offer a theoretical model of how contextual factors manifest themselves in the riot 
situation. The 2011 London Riots bring this gap into focus because the emotional 
dynamics which shaped the riot situation cannot be understood as purely internal to the 
situation. 
An opportunity to extend Collins’s theory can be found in the fact that interactions 
involve emotions. Some ‘primary emotions’ such as fear and surprise can be explained 
in terms of our common biology (Armon-Jones, 1986). However, bodily sensations 
need to be interpreted (Thoits, 1989). Moreover, in riots, ‘secondary emotions’ like 
pride, indignation, or solidarity will be significant. This pushes us towards a weak form 
of emotional constructivism, which acknowledges biological impulses, but argues that 
on their own they explain very little. We therefore need to tie emotions to our moral and 
empirical expectations (Hochschild, 1983; Harré, 1986; Jasper, 1998). This opens up a 
broad route through which we can reconnect situations with their wider context. 
The 2011 London Riots reveal two significant points of connection: participants’ 
expectations (i) of the police and (ii) of the everyday places of the riot. First, rioters’ 
emotional background is one of the most important features in the riot situation, and 
central to that background is their relationship with the police. This has been shown to 
be a central concern of rioters (Lewis et al., 2012; Kawalerowicz and Biggs, 2015), but 
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it is clear from footage of the riots that only a small number of rioters ever physically 
attacked the police. This animosity instead shaped the emotional high that rioters got 
from taking possession of streets that were normally so carefully policed. Looking 
specifically at stop and search as an interactional routine allows us to see how a history 
of interactions can be linked to the specific riot events through the notion of 
expectations. When police officers stop and search someone in an ‘unfairly targeted 
[…] aggressive and discourteous manner’ (Lewis et al., 2012, p. 4), they exploit their 
position of power to violate the ‘face’ he or she is presenting, ignoring the positive 
social value that person is claiming for themself (Goffman, 1967). These adversarial 
encounters then have lasting effects (Bradford, 2015), as people come to expect 
negative interactions in which they feel powerless and persecuted. A history of negative 
interactions thus provided a specific set of expectations which were briefly transcended 
in the ‘moral holiday’ of the riots. A BlackBerry Messenger message reported in the 
Guardian (9 August 2011, p. 7) makes this connection explicit: ‘Police have taken the 
piss for too long and to be honest I don’t know why it’s taken so long for us to make 
this happen’. 
The second point of connection is place. The riots happened in specific places and the 
emotional significance of these places was central to their situational dynamics. Place 
here has three elements: location, locale, and sense of place (Agnew, 1987). People 
targeted places located near them, with a certain material context (often large high 
streets), and, most importantly, which had specific personal and emotional resonances 
(Baudains, Braithwaite and Johnson, 2013). Sociological research has shown how 
different spaces can become associated with different meanings (Alexander, 2011; 
Cassidy, 2014); but, also, how places shape the identity ascribed to people (Saperstein 
and Penner, 2010) or the identities they themselves construct (Zhao, 1998). In the case 
of the London Riots both sides of this dialectic are significant. People chose to riot in 
places which already had specific meanings attached to them and, simultaneously, 
redefined those places as the free zones of the riot. Those places were associated with 
specific expectations which derived from people’s normal roles within them as 
consumers or commuters. Part of what made a riot situation so dramatic for participants 
is the sudden reversal of those expectations. Without acknowledging those expectations, 
we cannot hope to make sense of the interactions and behaviours which made up the 
2011 London Riots.  
I am not the first to suggest the importance of these factors. For example, in the UK, 
Keith (1993) and Gilroy (2002) characterised the Brixton Riots of 1981 as a community 
reacting to defend itself and its territory from an external invasion (the MPS’s Operation 
Swamp 81). However, there have been very few attempts to systematically link these 
factors to micro-situational accounts. One notable and powerful theorisation of this is 
the ‘flashpoint model of disorder’ (Waddington 1989, 2010; Waddington et al 2009). 
Waddington describes the flashpoint which causes the riot as a dramatic break in the 
pattern of interaction, which occurs in a defined situation shaped by contextual, cultural, 
political/ideological, and structural factors. These higher level factors shape the way 
that interactions are interpreted, the meanings ascribed to them and the signals given off 
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by participants (Waddington 1989). His focus on ‘meanings’ as the connection between 
different levels of analysis is vulnerable to criticism because it suggests that micro-level 
actions cannot shape higher level ones and so ignores the fact that the interpretation 
given by certain individuals (e.g. a police chief) matters more than any would-be 
rioter’s (Bagguley and Hussain 2008). Nevertheless, it is a fruitful starting point for 
analysis. However, adding expectations as another point of connection has two notable 
advantages. First, it draws attention to the sudden carnivalesque reversal of roles, norms 
and possibilities that happens in a riot. And second, it emphasises the centrality of 
emotions to the riot situation. 
This theoretical perspective has several methodological implications. Most 
straightforwardly it erodes the distinction between micro and macro (Crossley, 2010). It 
thus invites us to use micro-sociological data to test macro-level theories and, 
conversely, to develop contextual explanations from micro-sociological inquiry (e.g. 
Dynes and Quarantelli, 1968; Quarantelli and Dynes, 1970; Berk and Aldrich, 1972; 
Rosenfeld, 1997). This often requires the adoption of mixed methods. However, this 
need not imply any kind of philosophical incoherence (Crossley and Edwards, 2016). A 
mixture of methods may in fact be required to uncover the actual processes and 
mechanisms which underlie confrontational situations (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow, 
2008). But, whichever methods are used, micro-sociological research can be easily 
fitted into the pragmatist research cycle (Reichertz, 2013) of abduction of theories, 
deduction of hypotheses and inductive testing (recent examples of these various stages 
include Collins, 2012; Stevens et al, 2013; Weenink, 2014; Orsini, 2015; Nassauer, 
2015, 2016; Gross, 2016). 
Data and methods 
In answering the question ‘what shaped the patterns of interaction during the London 
Riots?’ I draw on two very different datasets. The first is a record of all arrests made by 
the MPS for riot-related offences. Of the 3,914 arrests made in London, the 
overwhelming majority came after the events, as 500 officers trawled through 20,000 
hours of CCTV footage (Home Affairs, 2012a). This means that measurements for 
timing and location of crimes are exceptionally good. I exclude those who were arrested 
for an offence committed after the riots (mostly handling stolen goods), and omit arrests 
where no offence type or crime location was recorded, leaving us with 2,089 instances. 
There seems to be little pattern to the missing data on location or type of crime and so 
this should not be particularly troubling. Although it is tempting to use this data to 
describe the types of behaviour which happened during the riot, senior MPS figures1 
leading the investigation said (in private conversations) that they deliberately focused 
on documenting and charging people with crimes which they felt would have the 
greatest chance of conviction. This seriously distorts the type of behaviours that were 
recorded: for example, there are no crimes of rioting recorded by the MPS at all. The 
proportions of types of behaviour quoted in several other studies (e.g. Newburn et al, 
2015) must therefore be treated with serious scepticism. However, there is no reason to 
suppose that it would also have distorted the location of events, and so it is those that I 
focus on. 
7 
This dataset was used in two ways: first, to map the locations of riot events and analyse 
their spatial patterns; second, to compare the profiles of areas targeted with those left 
untouched. The riot incidents are located by postcode, which cover on average fifteen 
properties giving considerable spatial precision in urban areas. Even though the arrest 
data is bound to be incomplete, there is little reason to believe, given the ubiquity of 
CCTV in London, that areas could have been affected without recording a single crime. 
We can therefore be fairly confident that it covers the full geographical spread of the 
rioting. 
The second dataset consists of over 15 hours of video footage and various testimonies 
of events on the ground. The ubiquity of mobile phones means that there are an 
unprecedented number of videos which show how events played out at ground level. 
Even though many were taken down for fear of incriminating participants, a great 
number remain on YouTube: 12.5 hours of amateur footage were analysed in total (all 
urls listed in Appendix 2 and, where relevant, links have been added as endnotes). This 
sample was found through keyword searches for ‘2011 riots’ and ‘2011 London riots’ 
and then by following related video links. Most of the footage comes from Tottenham, 
Croydon, Clapham Junction, and Hackney but it also covers Walworth, Peckham, 
Woolwich, and Ilford. This covers all of the areas affected by the riots and a large 
geographic spread of London from north to south; it provides an overview of the 
interactions which made up the London Riots. The YouTube footage was then 
compared against the narratives in three BBC documentaries which include extra 
footage and testimonies from rioters and the police (BBC, 2012a, b, c). It was also 
triangulated against the testimonies of on-duty officers collected for an MPS report 
(2012), of senior officers to the Home Affairs Select Committee (2012a), and of other 
bystanders (Kinghan, 2011; Ealing Council, 2012; Riots, Communities and Victims 
Panel, 2011, 2012). I also include some examples from semi-structured interviews I 
conducted with three people who took part in rioting in Clapham Junction. Initial 
contact was made with one of them through personal connections and the others reached 
through snowball sampling; however, I did not pursue further interviews because of 
problems of recall bias. 
I approached these qualitative sources in a grounded way (Strauss, 1987, Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990), coding each of the videos and testimonies for the different interactions 
(who did what to whom) and emotional dynamics they depict. When the quality of the 
recording was high enough those dynamics can be read directly from people’s facial 
expressions, if not sounds provided a guide to emotions, and, as a last resort, emotions 
were sometimes inferred from behaviours and body language (Klusemann, 2009; 
Nassauer, 2016). This grounded approach revealed four recurrent patterns of interaction. 
Following an abductive logic (Peirce 1974, vol. 5, p. 189), I argue that those patterns 
are best explained by the idea that rioters were ‘reclaiming the everyday’. The 
prevalence of these four patterns of interaction across all the available footage, together 
with provisional testing of my explanation, indicates that it is fairly robust. 
Any attempt to reconstruct interactional dynamics whether through interviews (Orsini, 
2015; Gross, 2016), archives (Matt, 2011; Weenink, 2014), videos (Nassauer, 2015), or 
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a mixture of sources (Petersen, 2002) runs into two problems. One is whether emotions 
can in fact be reliably reconstructed from those sources. This is always a difficult task, 
but one for which video footage is particularly well suited, for three reasons. First, 
everyday life is built on our ability to read emotions from body language, behaviours, 
and sounds, an ability which video evidence directly taps into (Collins, 2015). Second, 
videos of the sort used in this paper are public and very easily available, which allows 
for alternative readings to be conducted with much greater ease than interviews or 
archives. Third, footage showing the events in real time gives us a promising starting 
point when recreating emotional dynamics compared to retrospective interviews or 
memoirs (Knoblauch et al, 2012). 
The other problem is whether the sources in question give a representative sample of the 
interactions you are interested in. For riots there are two reasons why videos can be 
particularly useful in this regard. First, they provide multiple perspectives on the various 
events which make up a riot, a range which could not be captured ethnographically. And 
although the coverage provided by these videos is not systematic, in my case the 
comments and titles attached to them range from extremely positive to accusatory, and 
this should reassure readers that the fact of filming and uploading videos does not bias 
them beyond repair. Second, as others have shown (Stott and Reicher, 2011; Ketchley, 
2014), the enormous amount of audio-visual data publicly available online opens up 
opportunities for sociological research into sporadic and unpredictable events which are 
difficult to access in more traditional ways.  
Nevertheless, the problems of reconstruction and representativeness are serious ones. It 
is, therefore, extremely important to triangulate video evidence against other sources. 
And, although I have made extensive use of reports and testimonies, one limitation is 
that I could not get access to interviews conducted nearer the time. When the transcripts 
from large projects like Reading the Riots (Lewis et al, 2012) are made publicly 
available, they will be a major resource for those studying the London Riots. However, 
the level of detail and corroboration provided by the videos and various testimonies 
ultimately persuaded me that this is a valid way of reconstructing the riots’ situational 
dynamics. 
Challenging the criminal opportunism perspective 
The ‘criminal opportunism’ perspective is best represented by Treadwell et al.’s (2013) 
ethnographic research during and immediately after the riots. They argue that a feeling 
of general dissatisfaction, without any guiding political message, left people with 
‘nowhere to take their anger and resentment but the shops’ (p. 3). Although they give a 
stimulating account of this socio-political backdrop they assume that, once assembled, 
people’s behaviour was largely driven by criminal opportunism. They document people 
making thousands of pounds profit and purposefully looking for high value, branded 
goods (p. 12). It is important to note that the mere fact that looting took place does not 
mean that riots were simply criminal opportunism. Although some may have looted 
opportunistically, others were acting on desperate need (Sky News, 2011) or simply to 
keep the party going (27 per cent of premises targeted sold food and alcohol). But 
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Treadwell et al. clearly suggest that the situations and interactions which made up the 
riots were grounded in criminal opportunism. Therefore, if we accept their theory we 
would expect the riots to exhibit certain patterns of behaviour. I will look qualitatively 
at the interactions themselves in the next section but here want to focus on the spatial 
patterns predicted by the criminal opportunism perspective. 
There are two dimensions to this spatial patterning, both of which can be examined 
quantitatively. The first concerns the distribution of the riot events themselves. The 
criminal opportunism perspective implies each riot should spread out across space as 
rioters looked for new shops to loot. More precisely we would expect the average 
geographic spread of each riot to increase after the first night as the riots evolved from a 
protest at the killing of Mark Duggan to an ‘opportunity to do some free shopping’ 
(Treadwell et al, 2013, p. 1). There are two mechanisms which could generate this 
pattern. First, rioters generally assembled in central locations such as train stations and 
spread out from there. If motivated by criminal opportunism, people would presumably 
move further afield looking for new shops to loot. Second, there were reports of 
organized gangs targeting specific shops before moving on to high value targets in 
different parts of the borough. Both these mechanisms lead to the first hypothesis: 
H1: The riots should spread out further across space as rioters looked for new shops 
to loot. 
The second dimension concerns the locations targeted by rioters. McPhail and 
Wohlstein (1983) distinguish between three mechanisms behind the choice of targets 
during a riot: familiarity, attractiveness, and retaliation (attacking specific groups, often 
police or ethnic minorities). Of these three, ‘attractiveness’ is the most obvious 
companion of the criminal opportunism perspective, but it needs to be extended in two 
ways. First, the initial riots in Tottenham began outside the police station and spread out 
from there, whereas on subsequent nights people gathered with the specific purpose of 
rioting and looting. Therefore rioters’ location choice should become more strategic 
after the first night. Second, we would expect opportunistic criminals to take advantage 
of the unique circumstances to target unusual areas, from which it is normally difficult 
to steal. We therefore have two hypotheses: 
H2a After the first night, the areas targeted should become more attractive  
H2b After the first night, the areas targeted should become more unusual. 
Before moving on to the tests of these hypotheses, I want to answer the suggestion that 
these spatial patterns might be caused by the police containing rioters within certain 
areas or ‘allowing’ certain places to be attacked while protecting others. Ultimately both 
these suggestions overstate the power of the police on ground. As Sir Hugh Orde 
(President of the Association of Chief Police Officers) and Tim Godwin (Deputy 
Commissioner of the MPS) both admitted to the Home Affairs committee (2012a, Ev16 
and Ev17), the shortage of police officers made it almost impossible to secure the riots’ 
boundaries or respond decisively (this impotence is abundantly clear in the footage).2 
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The spread of rioting 
 
In order to operationalise the first hypothesis, I group individual crimes by borough. 
This leaves us with a ‘riot’ in each borough, composed of a set of crimes. For example, 
on the third night there was a ‘riot’ in Wandsworth (a borough in south west London) 
consisting of 114 crimes. This has the advantage of being an a priori classification and, 
moreover, each riot within London was entirely contained within borough borders. I 
then use two instruments to measure the geographical spread of each riot: the standard 
distance to the centroid (the square root of the average of the squared deviations from 
the mean coordinates), and the median distance to the centroid (Cressie, 1993). I also 
calculated the mean distance from each crime to its nearest neighbour, which shows 
how clustered the crimes were (O’Sullivan and Unwin, 2003). Although these are 
simple measures, they have the virtues of clarity and ease of interpretation and are more 
than sufficient to reveal the striking heterogeneity in the spatial patterns of different 
riots across London. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
Table 1 presents the average spread of the different riots by night and shows that they 
did not spread further or become less clustered over time. This undermines the claim 
that, after the first night, the riots became dominated by highly mobile gangs of looters. 
However, these averages disguise the real finding: the riots’ heterogeneity (Table 2). 
Riots in different places took on radically different spatial patterns. For example, the 
median distance to the centroid ranges from 47m (Hackney) to 3732m (Bromley), with 
a standard deviation of 828m. Figure 1 shows the location of riot crimes in four 
different boroughs at the same resolution. The riots in Wandsworth are significantly 
more clustered than any of the other three, largely contained within two streets. This 
variety is not explained by the number of events in each riot or their duration. In the 
face of this diversity it is difficult to sustain any single explanatory narrative and 
certainly not one which predicts an increase in the area covered by each riot after the 
first night. 
In order to fully explain the heterogeneity in spatial patterns we will no doubt need to 
look at a variety of mechanisms. But it is clear that ‘criminal opportunism’ can not 
account for the spatial extent of the 2011 London Riots. As a case study this also throws 
up an interesting challenge: to explain how a riot can sustain itself in a confined space 
for several hours. Collins’s (2008) argument that looting is the primary ‘crowd 
sustainer’ during riots implies that rioters need new shops to loot and that, once an area 
has been burnt out, it will be difficult for the riot to continue. Clapham Junction is an 
instructive counter-example because that riot sustained itself over several hours in two 
short sections of road. This is something which will be returned to below. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
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Attractive targets 
In order to test the second set of hypotheses, that the rioters would target attractive 
(H2a) and unusual (H2b) areas, I mapped each riot crime onto two spatial geographies: 
one small (Lower Layer Super Output Areas, LSOAs) and one large (Middle Super 
Output Areas, MSOAs). These are both standard spatial units for government data in the 
UK. In London there are 4835 LSOAs covering on average 0.325km2, within 983 
MSOAs which average 1.60km2. Although greater spatial precision is desirable, 
participants seemed to discuss where to riot in fairly general terms, often mentioning 
whole boroughs (MPS 2012; BBC 2012a). Therefore, I examine both geographic scales. 
Mapping each recorded crime onto an area allowed me to compare areas with rioting to 
areas without. The ‘attractiveness’ of an area is measured using the Total Retail Floor 
Space statistic from the Valuation Office Agency’s Commercial and Industrial 
Floorspace and Rateable Value Statistics series for 2011. As a test of robustness all 
analysis was repeated using this data on the Number of Retail Properties, and the results 
remain the same. I measured how ‘unusual’ a site for crime each area was using MPS 
data for total retail crime in the four months leading up to August 2011 (mostly theft 
from shops but also robbery from business premises and burglaries in other buildings). I 
also include transport links (the number of tube and train stops) and the number of riot 
events in adjacent areas as control variables. This results in two datasets with a well-
balanced panel structure with four observations (Nights 1 to 4) per unit (each 
LSOA/MSOA). As I am interested in time-invariant factors, I have used random effects 
models. I look at the likelihood of a riot happening in an area using logit models, and 
the intensity of rioting (the number riot crimes per area) using negative binomial models 
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008). 
My results provide no support for the ‘criminal opportunism’ perspective. Table 3 
shows that the association between ‘attractiveness’ and rioting is only significant at the 
LSOA level. The effect is however extremely small and the probability of a riot 
increases from 1.0 per cent for areas with less than 500m2 retail space, to 1.1 per cent 
for areas at the mean (3430m2); even areas with 100,000m2 have only a 4.4 per cent 
chance of rioting (probabilities calculated for Night 3 with all other variables set to 0). 
Most importantly and directly contrary to hypothesis 2a, this association does not 
change over the four nights while the main effect becomes non-significant. The four 
negative binomial models in Table 4 tell the same story: more attractive areas saw 
somewhat more intense rioting, but there was no change over time. The results also 
contradict hypothesis 2b, showing that areas with high levels of routine retail crime 
were in fact more likely to see riots and that those riots were more intense. This makes 
it difficult to sustain the idea that rioters carefully and deliberately chose areas which 
facilitated high profit looting. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
[Table 4 here] 
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One possible counterargument is that, irrespective of how attractive the area was, people 
specifically targeted high value shops like Footlocker (a sports and footwear 
retailer)(Treadwell et al, 2013) and Currys (an electrical retailer)3. The Home Office 
data on the victims of the riots (obtained under Freedom of Information) gives limited 
support for this idea. Only half of all crimes targeted commercial premises and this 
fluctuates without trend across the four days.4 Although the proportion of commercial 
targets that are obviously ‘high value’ (clothing stores, electrical stores, and jewellers) 
increases after the first night, they account for only 27 per cent of the commercial 
premises targeted overall, the same percentage as sold food and alcohol. Whilst I do not 
want to discount the evidence that some high value shops may have been targeted 
opportunistically, ‘criminal opportunism’ clearly cannot account for the full range of 
riot targets. 
In fact even in the act of looting there is little evidence that people were acting as 
opportunistic criminals. Looting instead seems to be a public and collective act of 
defiance and celebration. This is clearest in moments when people paraded their stolen 
goods in front of the crowds, sharing out packets of stolen cigarettes, even throwing 
bundles of clothes out of a shop for everyone else.5 One of those I spoke to described 
walking round the Debenhams in Clapham Junction filling a shopping trolley which he 
then abandoned at the door when he realised ‘I ain’t gonna wear none of this shit’. 
Footage also shows the joyous destruction of shops while high value electronic goods 
lie smashed on the streets.6 Tellingly, at one point someone can be heard saying: ‘What 
have you got?’ ‘Don't even know!’.7 Indeed Reverend Perkin of Clapham Junction’s St 
Marks Church described the riots as ‘a very, very hyped up, intense celebration that, 
“we can do this and we can get away with it”’ (2011). 
The spatial patterns revealed by this dataset therefore contradict both hypotheses 
derived from the ‘criminal opportunism’ perspective. These results do not mean that no 
rioters were motivated by criminal opportunism, but they do suggest that its importance 
has been overstated and that it can explain very little of the actual interactions which 
made up the riots. In fact, the rioting that engulfed London seems to be too 
heterogeneous to be explained by any one theory, and I do not wish to replace criminal 
opportunism with another single explanatory factor. We do, however, need new 
mechanisms and explanations which we can add to our account. And to do this I turn to 
a more directly situational analysis based on footage of the riots themselves. 
Reclaiming the everyday 
Having demonstrated the deficiencies of the ‘criminal opportunism’ approach, my 
original contribution is to introduce a factor which has been generally overlooked in 
academic and popular accounts of the 2011 London Riots: reclaiming the everyday. The 
video footage consulted suggests that the London Riots were a way for people to take 
possession of the public spaces in which they lived, an opportunity to reclaim these 
ordinary places. I am not suggesting that this was an explicit political project (although 
for some rioters it might have been), but rather that, for many rioters, the emotional 
energy of the situation came from the sudden thrill of being in control of these familiar 
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places. (A similar, though more muted, sense of excitement can be seen when snowfall 
shuts down normally busy city streets.8) The importance of this dynamic is revealed in 
four themes which recur time after time in the available footage: (i) the importance of 
familiarity, (ii) the physical occupation of public spaces, (iii) the delimitation of the ‘riot 
space’, and (iv) the failure of standard police public order tactics. 
The importance of familiarity 
The fact that these were familiar, everyday places can also be seen in almost all of the 
available footage. In Croydon, rioters played a constant game of cat-and-mouse with the 
police, using their knowledge of the streets to avoid confrontations wherever possible 
(MPS 2012). A scene from Hackney shows a man arguing that these are ‘my own 
streets’ before telling the police to ‘go home!’9. Thus, where the rioters chose to go was 
driven by familiarity, but where the rioters did not go is also illustrative. I asked one of 
my interviewees why he thought rioters made no effort to challenge the fragile police 
line at the end of the Northcote Road (a shopping street full of high-end retail stores 
directly adjoining the main site of the riots in Clapham Junction). He looked at me as if 
I was mad before explaining that the Northcote Road was a totally different world to 
Clapham Junction proper. Those up-market, boutique stores catered to a different 
demographic and, consequentially, it is experienced as a radically different space, 
despite being a continuation of the same street. The rioters were staking a claim to the 
places in which they lived. 
Although these places were familiar, they were not spaces over which people normally 
exercised control. These high streets were busy thoroughfares with police patrols (and 
associated stop-and-searches), chain stores, and traffic. Therefore when rioting broke 
out, it gave people an opportunity to take possession of areas in which they were 
normally mere passersby or passive consumers. The thrill of taking control of these 
familiar places is mentioned time after time in the interviews I and others have 
conducted. As one young man put it: ‘we had total control of the precinct […] It was 
ours for a day’ (Lewis et al 2012, p. 20). 
The physical occupation of public spaces 
The second theme that suggests the importance of reclaiming everyday places is the fact 
that for many rioters the emotional energy came not from their own actions but simply 
from physically occupying their streets. This is most obvious in the carnivalesque 
actions of the crowd of bystanders, a group who are often forgotten in analyses of riots 
despite their critical importance to the situational dynamics (Collins, 2008). Indeed it is 
surprising that, even in the edited and carefully shot footage that was uploaded to 
YouTube, there is a lot of downtime.10 Reading against the grain, we might infer that 
the riots were far less action-packed and intense than people often suppose. 
Almost all the footage shows groups of bystanders standing around, drinking and 
smoking. This crowd dynamic is manifest in a scene where a large crowd leans against 
the railings on the corner of Peckham Rye and Peckham High Street, cheering on those 
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few rioters brave enough to directly confront the police or smash windows.11 In 
Clapham Junction we see rioters physically taking possession of the streets, sitting 
down in the middle of the usually busy road, drinking, smoking, and hanging out.12 
There were similar scenes in Peckham as people stood around in the middle of the road, 
with more aggressive members of the crowd kicking out at passing cars provoking 
laughter from others.13 These bystanders are united not by the ‘madding crowd’ or their 
own actions but an emotional energy grounded in pre-existing emotional investments in 
and expectations about these places (this is something that may hold true for bystanders 
in other riots as well, see McPhail and Wohlstein, 1983). This also suggests an 
explanation of how the riot in Clapham Junction could sustain itself for so long in such 
a confined space. The thrill of being in control of that normally busy high street could 
have been generated, not through endless looting, but by the simple fact of taking 
physical possession of the streets. 
The delimitation of the riot space 
As well as physically occupying these familiar places, rioters also exerted spatial 
agency by defining and delimiting the free zone of the riots (Sewell, 2001). This is 
clearest in the interactions between rioters and the police. Although angry, it is rare to 
see rioters make a concerted effort to challenge the fragmented police line. Instead 
people improvised barricades to physically demarcate the space of the riot, symbolizing 
their control of the area. Footage from Tottenham shows police cars and bins being set 
alight for just this purpose14 and this quickly became an established part of the 
repertoire of rioting (MPS, 2012). Meanwhile rioters peacock in front of the police line, 
taunting them and provoking them to break rank and challenge the rioters’ control of 
those spaces. This is a very different dynamic to that implied by descriptions of rioters 
as opportunistic criminals or violent thugs. The focus here was on places, not people. 
Criminal damage produced the most emotive visual and sonic symbols of the riot 
territory. All the available footage shows the powerful response that fire and smashed 
windows evokes from the assembled crowd.15 In Hackney graffiti played a similar role, 
with quickly scrawled tags saying ‘Fuck Cameroon [sic]’ and ‘Fuck Feds’ marking out 
the rioters’ territory.16 Sounds are also important for characterising places (Schwarz, 
2015). Especially in the short run, the sounds of breaking glass, shouting, and sirens 
were a key part of what marked out the space of the riot.17 Although all riots rely on 
visual and sonic symbols to claim spaces, what is significant here is that there is also an 
underlying pattern to where was targeted. Participants exerted their energy in claiming 
specific, familiar places and, once they had claimed a particular place, they held onto 
it.18 
The failure of police tactics 
Another recurrent theme in the footage (and MPS reports) is the failure of the MPS’s 
standard public order tactic. The running line (ACPO, 2004) can be seen time after time 
in the available footage.19 It involves charging forward roughly 30 yards as a unit before 
stopping to regroup, aiming to break up and disperse the crowd (ACPO, 2004). 
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Crucially, it focuses on persons and bodies, even listing as an aim ‘To reduce crowd-
generated excitement and momentum’ (ACPO, 2004, p. 76). This approach derives in 
part from ideas of the ‘madding crowd’, and prioritises disrupting the bodily density of 
the crowd (explicitly in the 2010 edition, p. 88). However, it does nothing to challenge 
the rioters’ control over space, and this goes a long way to explain its ineffectiveness. 
YouTube videos show rioters running away from the police charge, but then laughing 
and shouting as the police stop and back off to regroup.20 Even though the dense crowd 
might be broken up by the charge, if the fundamental emotional energy is derived from 
controlling the space, then until this is challenged the riot will continue. 
That this failure was due to the importance of place, not simply inadequate police 
numbers, is revealed through a contrast to the highly successful tactic used by police in 
Sutton (an area in south London). Here a potential riot was defused by police marching 
slowly down Sutton High Street, batons raised; physically taking possession of the 
street and demonstrating their control of it (MPS, 2012; Home Office Evidence 2012a, 
Ev17). This chimes with Newburn’s (2016) suggestion that interactional factors 
primarily explain why riots did not break out in Leeds and Bristol. It is also worth 
noting that when other police forces tried to act pre-emptively, because they were 
targeting bodies, they were wholly ineffective. The escalation of events in Tottenham 
has been attributed to pre-emptive police deployment (Stott and Reicher, 2011), while 
in Clapham Junction the police were in the end only able to react to crowds when and 
where they assembled (MPS, 2012). By laying claim to the place of the riot, Sutton 
Police were able to defuse the emotional energy that came from reclaiming the 
everyday. And without this it was impossible for rioters to create and sustain the moral 
holiday. 
Discussion 
The prevalence of these four themes (familiarity, the physical occupation of places, the 
delimitation of the riot space, and the failure of police tactics) across all the available 
footage demonstrates that the specific places in which the riots happened shaped their 
situational dynamics. The thrill of reclaiming these everyday places was a central part of 
the London Riots, and something which has been largely ignored thus far. The most 
obvious implication of this theory is that rioters would tend to target areas they were 
familiar with. Fortunately this can be tested, because the MPS dataset used above 
includes rioters’ home addresses. We therefore know that 50% of those arrested lived 
within 2.5km of where they rioted. A more sophisticated analysis of this same data by 
Baudains, Braithwaite and Johnson (2013) uses a random utility model to analyse 
rioters' choice of where to riot. They show that rioters were more likely to target areas 
close to their homes, on the same side of the Thames, and which contained a secondary 
school (an important consideration given the relatively young ages of many rioters). 
More subtle support comes from the fact that the effects of familiarity were greater for 
young rioters who we can assume had smaller ‘awareness spaces’ (Benasco, 2010). 
Although their paper is extremely insightful, I want to challenge their interpretation of 
these findings. They motivate their study in the language of Crime Pattern Theory 
(Cohen and Felson, 1979; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993), which argues that 
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criminals are likely to commit offences in areas which they know. This preserves 
criminal opportunism as rioters' underlying motivation. However, given the lack of 
quantitative or qualitative support for the criminal opportunism perspective in general, I 
believe that we need to reassess the significance of this finding. Rather than simply 
stealing from places they knew, the riots could have been a way for people to reclaim 
those familiar places. For example, one rioter I spoke said the reason he went down to 
the Clapham Junction was because ‘it was my ends innit’ (ends is English slang for your 
home neighbourhood). 
A further implication is that we would expect to see a focus on themes of power and 
celebration in the testimonies of rioters. In order to fully explore this we would need to 
analyse the original transcripts of interviews conducted nearer the time if and when they 
are made public. However, in the excerpts which are currently available, there are some 
indications that these themes were fairly common. A significant number highlight the 
importance of power, specifically the ability to take revenge for perceived injustices 
(Sky News [2011] also reported people targeting shops which had turned down job 
applications in the past). Respondents in the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel 
Interim Report said: ‘They’re [the police] just the biggest gang on the block – but they 
weren’t that day’, ‘They never listen to us – they did that day’ and that ‘This was is our 
chance to make history’ (2011, p. 59-60). Similarly respondents to the NatCen study 
said that ‘It was a chance. They wanted to show police what they could do’ (Morrell et 
al 2011, p. 32). There were also many accounts of the riots’ celebratory side: ‘People 
were cheering, like. It was like a party, sitting on the roofs of cars opening cans’ 
(Morrell et al, 2011, p. 35), ‘So many youths, so many policemen, so many people I 
recognised, laughing, having fun, literally joking’ (Morrell et al, 2011, p. 35), ‘it’s like 
everyone is on one, it’s just like a party today, you got to join in!’ (Treadwell et al, 
2013, p. 9), ‘they was breaking into shops and they was literally smashing things up, 
they was just trashing it for the sake of trashing it, not for any financial gain or 
anything’ (Newburn et al, 2015, p. 13) and ‘This is the most exciting two nights of my 
life’ (Riots, Communities and Victims Panel, 2011, p. 59). 
However, I do not want to suggest that this is the only dynamic at play. As is clear from 
the spatial patterns I documented and from the video footage, the riots were 
heterogenous and complex, composed of many different sorts of actions and 
interactions. The NatCen study provides a useful typology of riot behaviour which 
ranges from non-involvement to watching, protesting, violence and finally looting 
(Morrell et al 2011, p. 25). Within these the video archives reveal further variation: 
watching can include cheering crowds or more nervous voyeurs; protesting can be 
implicit or explicit, physical or verbal; violence can be directed against civilians, police 
or property; and looting can be organised and opportunistic or impromptu and 
celebratory. The implication that there is a simple linear relationship between 
motivation for participation and the type of behaviour exhibited must be resisted 
(Turner and Killian, 1957, Akram, 2014). But, as a typology, this helpfully captures the 
complexity and heterogeneity of the riots, thus confirming what we know from other 
studies (McPhail and Wohlstein, 1983; Bagguley and Hussain, 2008; Newburn et al, 
2015). ‘Reclaiming the everyday’ is therefore a dynamic which should be added to a 
17 
range of different explanatory mechanisms, it is not on its own a sufficient account of 
the full range of riot behaviours. Nevertheless, the four themes identified in the video 
footage are sufficiently common-place to be worthy of serious critical attention. In 
particular, footage of people hanging out and ‘occupying the streets’ occurs in almost 
every video and accounts for a significant proportion of the total time filmed. Given that 
this behaviour can be most plausibly explained as reflecting people’s excitement at 
reclaiming the everyday places in which they live, it should be seen as a vitally 
important dynamic. 
Conclusion 
The situational approach to rioting forces us to focus on the actual interactions, 
situations, and behaviours that make up a riot. In the case of the 2011 London Riots, this 
allows us to develop testable hypotheses from the dominant criminal opportunism 
perspective. Having demonstrated that these hypotheses are in fact contradicted by the 
riots’ spatial patterns, I returned to footage of the events in search of alternative 
explanations. They showed that, for many people, the riots were an opportunity to 
reclaim the everyday places in which they lived. Recognising the importance of this 
dynamic allows us to draw a few tentative conclusions about the 2011 London Riots. 
First, it challenges the existing emphasis on looting. I am not suggesting that this played 
no role in the riots. In fact, one of my interviewees saw ‘professionals’ empty the stock 
room at the back of an electrical store before driving off in an unmarked van. Others 
have documented the high profits made by looters (Treadwell et al., 2013) and that 
some openly admitted to being motivated by the chance to steal (Lewis et al., 2012). 
But this narrow focus on looting has distorted our understanding of the London Riots in 
three ways. First, a significant amount of criminal activity was non-acquisitive and, 
once we include bystanders, it is clear that any explanation based solely on criminal 
opportunism will be inadequate. Second, by isolating acquisitive crime we ignore the 
violence which enabled and characterised it (see the terrified police testimonies in BBC, 
2012c; Newburn et al., 2015). Third, by interpreting looting instrumentally we ignore its 
expressive qualities. And this matters if we want to understand the meanings these 
actions had for participants and so develop fuller theories which account for a wider 
range of riot behaviours. 
Second, after shifting focus towards ‘reclaiming the everyday’, the London Riots 
actually fit much more closely with the prevailing interpretation of looting as ritualistic, 
impromptu, and celebratory (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1968; Quarantelli and Dynes, 
1970; Collins, 2008). This contradicts the suggestions of some commentators (Zižek, 
2011, Winlow and Hall, 2012) and it invites us to ask new and different questions about 
the riots. Instead of asking what the family backgrounds of the rioters were (the Mayor 
of London Office’s approach) or why they have embraced a consumerist ideology, we 
should instead focus on why these familiar places had such emotional resonance. It 
could be because of a history of marginalisation and alienation (Akram, 2014), more 
recent threats of gentrification (Valluvan, 2011), or an amoral ‘sense of entitlement’ 
(Prime Minister David Cameron). Answering these questions will require significant 
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empirical attention in the future but, for now, it is worth noting that structural economic 
and political factors are likely to be much more important than many commentators 
have wanted to admit. Instead of casting moral judgments on the ‘feral underclass’ (as 
claimed by Justice Secretary Ken Clarke), we need to recognise that they came from 
deprived and disorganised areas with a history of police animosity (Kawalerowicz and 
Biggs, 2015). This may have been the uncomfortable truth that David Cameron wanted 
to avoid coming out of a public inquiry, but it is something we need to acknowledge if 
we are to more fully understand and explain the 2011 London Riots. 
Third, it complicates another often-mentioned dynamic: animosity towards the police. 
Rioters in London were more likely to come from areas which already had poor 
relationships with the police (Kawalerowicz and Biggs, 2015). Frustration at people’s 
everyday treatment by the police (particularly stop-and-search) was also mentioned by 
almost all the rioters interviewed by Lewis et al. (2012) and even in various videos21. 
However, there is only limited evidence that it structured people’s actual behaviour 
during the riots. The police themselves reported ‘venomous’ violence and 
‘unprecedented […] level of hatred towards the police’ (BBC, 2012c) and police 
property became a target for rioters’ rage (MPS, 2012, p. 45). There was, however, 
significant variation in interactions between rioters and police: from extreme violence in 
Tottenham and Hackney, to avoiding the police in Croydon (MPS, 2012). Moreover 
almost all the available footage shows that only a small minority of rioters ever actively 
attacked the police. Therefore, animosity towards the police is not, on its own, an 
adequate explanation of the pattern of interactions. It should rather be seen as (i) a 
‘trigger’ in that the initial unrest began with a protest outside Tottenham Police Station, 
and (ii) one of the background conditions which shaped people’s estrangement from 
public spaces and the thrill they got from taking control of them. 
Fourth, there are also subtle differences between the dynamics observed in 2011 and 
those in earlier British riots (although this difference should not be overstated, see 
Newburn, 2015). First, there is an important difference between between defending your 
territory (Gilroy, 2002) and reclaiming something which you feel distanced from. There 
is a much more palpable sense in 1981 that this was a community who felt a concrete 
sense of ownership over the places in which they rioted (Keith, 1993). But, in 2011 
there is instead the suggestion that people felt increasingly alienated from the places of 
the riot (Valluvan, 2011). People were reclaiming places in which they lived but which 
they did not normally control. Second, the fact that the 2011 riots were triggered by a 
protest at the killing of a mixed-race man invites comparisons with race riots in the 
USA,  Brixton 1981 and more recent race riots of the early 2000s. However, the ethnic 
diversity of rioters suggests that these events cannot be seen as ‘race riots’ in the same 
way (Home Office, 2011). While race may well have been a significant factor 
(especially in the epicentre in Tottenham), it does not seem to have structured the 
overall dynamics of the riots as much as in those earlier examples. 
Fifth, it forces us to think again about the ‘post-political city’. Research over the last ten 
years has detailed various ways in which urban spaces and culture more broadly have 
been de-politicised (Crouch, 2004; Rosanvallon, 2007; Epstein and Iveson, 2009; 
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MacLeod and Jones, 2011; Winlow et al, 2015; Haughton, Gilchrist and Swyngedouw, 
2016). This focus has been criticised from a variety of perspectives (Swyngedouw, 
2014; Davidson and Iveson, 2015). And recently Millington (2016) suggested that the 
2011 London Riots yet again revealed the limits of de-politicisation. He argues that the 
‘wish-fulfilment, or “truth”, that might be found in a sportswear shop such as Foot 
Locker [...] is still hope’ and so constitutes a desire for change and a form of proto-
political ‘anticipatory consciousness’ (p. 8). My focus on the importance of everyday 
places might therefore encourage us to see the riots as anticipating resistance to the 
ongoing enclosure of urban public spaces (Smith and Low, 2005; Hodkinson, 2012; 
Harvey, 2013). However, it is worth noting that if they do so, it is in a way that is very 
different to recent protests focused on place, such as Occupy, or Tahrir Square. Instead 
of occupying exceptional, political, or symbolic places, the London Riots saw people 
take possession of the everyday places in which they lived. And, while I support 
Millington’s critique of the criminal opportunism perspective, I am reluctant to put too 
much emphasis on the riots as anticipating an urban politics. Although there are some 
continuing echoes of 2011 (Peacock, 2014; Millington, 2016), more research is needed 
to see how widespread they are. And, meanwhile, the main effect of the riots has been, 
just as Gilroy (2013) predicted, a neoliberal, property-led regeneration scheme for 
Tottenham (Dillon and Fanning, 2015). 
By uncovering this dynamic of ‘reclaiming the everyday’ I hope to provide those 
studying other riots with something new to look for in their data. I am unsure how 
widespread this dynamic is, but it certainly follows a pattern in contemporary protest 
more generally. It also forces us to acknowledge that riots occur against a broader social 
backdrop which shapes the riot’s situational dynamics. Most obviously, people often 
riot in particular places and so carry into the situation a variety of expectations about 
them. Finding theoretically sophisticated ways of embedding contextual factors into a 
micro-sociological framework remains a real challenge for this sort of approach to 
violence and rioting. The notion of expectations is just one way in which this can be 
done. But in the case of riots, when normal and ‘expected’ patterns of interaction are so 
suddenly disrupted, it may prove to be an important one. 
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Appendix 1 
Summary statistics 
 LSOA MSOA 
Observations 19340 3932 
Riot Affected Areas 415 338 
Number of Riot Crimes 0.11 (1.46) 0.53 (3.98) 
Retail Floor Space (1000m2) 3.43 (12.22) 18.57 (38.73) 
Retail Crime 4.82 (12.81) 23.72 (36.26) 
Transport Links 0.0089 (0.30) 0.44 (0.65) 
Notes: Figures presented are means with standard errors in brackets. 
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Appendix 2 
urls for all footage used: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k7H02HSip_c 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IpKBHiJT8kU 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhMwmEm4sJU 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VFNkJRCNHAs 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5nedEE6UwYQ 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_88xo2mAyA 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FIoL1AntLCw 
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xkg02i_london-riots-2011-raw-footage-of-mobattacking- 
police_news 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oltjnl24iHQ 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5sqf10GSls 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFsiTG5xKqs 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KZzUvDtmhaw 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3AgH96OQlc 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5DhY1uKq6r4 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R-7O7eafQi8 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lztinN3-Hg 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=20ge7WsMBdI 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwAAjM6opY0 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B4b8JmYk30M 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xw5hJ1pIVD4 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HPB1LQxMCoM 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MP-td3C55Yc 
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https://www.youtube.com/user/markosilla/videos 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PGOaWsrk2BY 
https://www.youtube.com/user/balladanna/videos 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVVDyf9X23U 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-08-09/uk-riots3a-videos-from-the-scene/2831314 
http://www.rawcutarchive.com/archive.aspx?type=28&search=london%20riots 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ed0QJJL9sYQ 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yjZI1UH52rw 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47SVLTJpvRg 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rFUtyVLABhQ 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aZWQoJtvaoU 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5FZydkH9XJg 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-m3m74WRcc 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BpW7KR9-6Fk 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iRqWVVpeKP4 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lGj-8jbdW4 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_LzWOSAT_DA 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpWvrF2PpaU 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y29t8033g9M 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w0BWhjf8t7U 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6AOHI--DsWw 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aCEOpDp3I-E&list=PL4AFF9DA6C0983969 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yR6jv66btqg 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aho-NXz7jqo 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BNeSpCs6mlM 
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S5anqRmhaeY 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-TVfVT8ydU 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bqg2nqZbVmE 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mOT_itNro20 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=039a3KPugcs 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rAKsYBq1f0U 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=61w1QH40mLU 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-quSzQgZHSY 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rXtjO74cQq0 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S7if6Fm3In8 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0dnp3dbiRf8&list=PLjRtdIAMnD8bbpA2dhQai 
Le8jMKthMy9d 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vfwr9FJc9sg 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fGRBFwpuKv8 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3o9p3ydGq28 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XZoGDVOX32U 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R1-XlVJSQ24 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7r7VBSi_x_8 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KsTXagvMcHw 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/09/london-riots-2011-videos_n_922561.html  
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Table 1: Geographic Spread of Rioting by Night 
Night N 
Standard Distance 
to Centroid (m) 
Median Distance to 
Centroid (m) 
Mean Nearest 
Neighbour Distance 
(m) 
Night 1 91 1551 1575 46.51 
Night 2 228 1429 886 85.01 
Night 3 1465 1479 741 46.57 
Night 4 45 1209 765 90.86 
Notes: Standard distance and mean nearest neighbour distance were calculated for each riot (e.g. Haringey Night 1) and then 
averaged by Night (with each riot weighted by total number of crimes committed within it). Median distance was calculated by 
grouping all distances from crime to respective centroid by night. Only boroughs with more than 15 crimes were included. 
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Table 2: Geographic Spread of Rioting By Borough 
Night Borough N 
Standard 
Distance to 
Centroid (m) 
Median 
Distance to 
Centroid (m) 
Mean Nearest 
Neighbour 
Distance (m) 
Night 1 Haringey 91 1551 1575 46.51 
Night 2 Croydon 30 1299 748 131.10 
 Enfield 99 1684 1059 110.20 
 Lambeth 62 1073 706 37.87 
 Waltham Forest 37 1451 623 59.25 
Night 3 
Barking & 
Dagenham 
35 1513 467 111.90 
 Barnet 27 4003 3047 123.70 
 Bromley 61 4859 3732 50.13 
 Camden 85 748 500 6.10 
 Croydon 207 1617 1067 28.24 
 Ealing 95 1437 1293 94.32 
 Greenwich 147 1465 705 34.45 
 Hackney 138 516 47 22.55 
 
Kensington & 
Chelsea 
27 1754 989 36.40 
 Lambeth 34 1817 1652 69.80 
 Lewisham 98 1803 838 46.19 
 Merton 45 450 201 0 
 Newham 83 1385 741 53.43 
 Redbridge 43 2305 1190 86.78 
 Southwark 123 1238 1088 24.22 
 Tower Hamlets 42 1191 672 52.95 
 Wandsworth 114 771 96 32.68 
Night 4 Newham 26 1425 812 156.60 
Notes: All boroughs with more than 25 crimes. 
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Table 3: Likelihood of Rioting by Commerciality and Unusualness 
 LSOA LSOA MSOA MSOA 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Night 2 3.54*** 3.10*** 3.83*** 3.65*** 
Night 3 12.63*** 11.24*** 13.04*** 12.83*** 
Night 4 4.62*** 4.23*** 6.12*** 6.34*** 
Retail Floor Space 
(1000m2) 1.01*** 1.01 1 1 
Retail Floor Space X 
Night 2  1.01  1 
Retail Floor Space X 
Night 3  1.01  1 
Retail Floor Space X 
Night 4  1.01  1 
Retail Crime 1.02*** 1.02* 1.01* 1.01 
Retail Crime X Night 2  1  1 
Retail Crime X Night 3  1  1 
Retail Crime X Night 4  1  1 
Transport Links 1.48* 1.48* 1.21 1.21 
Rioting Nearby 1.08*** 1.08*** 1.05*** 1.05*** 
Constant 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Observations 19340 19340 3932 3932 
Areas 4835 4835 983 983 
AIC 3315 3325 1919 1930 
Notes: Logit models estimated using generalised least squares with random effects and conventional standard errors. Coefficients 
shown as Odds Ratios. 
*p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001 
Reference Category = Night 1 
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Table 4: Intensity of Rioting by Commerciality and Unusualness 
 LSOA LSOA MSOA MSOA 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Night 2 3.48*** 3.02*** 3.55*** 3.43*** 
Night 3 10.76*** 11.10*** 11.03*** 11.15*** 
Night 4 3.94*** 3.70*** 4.64*** 5.14*** 
Retail Floor Space 
(1000m2) 1.01** 1.01 1.01** 1.01 
Retail Floor Space X 
Night 2  1.02  1 
Retail Floor Space X 
Night 3  1  1 
Retail Floor Space X 
Night 4  1.01  1 
Retail Crime 1.02*** 1.03* 1 1 
Retail Crime X Night 2  0.99  1 
Retail Crime X Night 3  1  1 
Retail Crime X Night 4  0.99  1 
Transport Links 1.42* 1.37 0.99 0.99 
Rioting Nearby 1.05*** 1.06*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 
Constant 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
Observations 19340 19340 3932 3932 
Areas 4835 4835 983 983 
AIC 5177 5177 3528 3537 
Notes: Negative binomial models estimated using generalised least squares with random effects and conventional standard errors. 
Coefficients shown as Incidence Rate Ratios. 
*p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001 
Reference Category = Night 1 
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Figure 1: Riot crimes in four London boroughs 
1  I had two separate conversations with two senior MPS figures over the phone during July 2015, 
each one lasting around 30 minutes. Introductions were obtained through a contact at the College of 
Policing and our discussion focussed on the practicalities of their investigation as a way to check the 
validity of the arrest data. 
2  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=20ge7WsMBdI, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_LzWOSAT_DA, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y29t8033g9M 
3  http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-08-09/uk-riots3a-videos-from-the-scene/2831314 
4  The data is grouped by calendar day which makes precise comparison of ‘nights’ difficult. 
5  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aZWQoJtvaoU,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5sqf10GSls 
6  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ed0QJJL9sYQ, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-08-
09/uk-riots3a-videos-from-the-scene/2831314 
7  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ed0QJJL9sYQ 
8  My thanks to Randall Collins for this suggestion. 
9  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yR6jv66btqg 
10  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_LzWOSAT_DA, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iRqWVVpeKP4 
11  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KZzUvDtmhaw 
12  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-m3m74WRcc, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lGj-
8jbdW4, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_LzWOSAT_DA 
13  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFsiTG5xKqs 
14  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhMwmEm4sJU 
15  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3o9p3ydGq28 
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16  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-TVfVT8ydU (1:18) 
17  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aCEOpDp3I-E&list=PL4AFF9DA6C0983969, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R-7O7eafQi8 
18  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhMwmEm4sJU 
19  e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bqg2nqZbVmE 
20  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5sqf10GSls, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ed0QJJL9sYQ 
21  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FIoL1AntLCw, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
quSzQgZHSY 
